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ABSTRACT: Several different strategies for control and eradication of classical swine fever (CSF) were compared 
using a Monte Carlo method-based simulation model. The control strategy analysed in this paper, in addition to 
other CSF control measures, includes application of biosecurity measures on pig farms and rural backyard hold-
ings. Elements of the control strategy are based on applicable regulations and include the simulation of detection 
of the disease, setting up the protected and surveillance zones, standstill of pig movements and restricted move-
ment of animals, vehicles, equipment, and people with strong control measures in protection and surveillance 
zones, euthanasia of susceptible pigs, protective vaccination of pigs, compensation etc. During the simulation, 
different output parameters were compared such as: duration of epidemic of a disease, number of affected hold-
ings and animals, direct costs such as those for dead or culled animals, costs of surveillance, disposal of infectious 
materials, cleaning and disinfection. Depopulation of affected animals with early diagnostics and vaccination in 
the protection and surveillance zone proved to be the most effective measures to stop the spread and for the 
eradication of the disease. Moreover, during the simulation, systematic implementation of biosecurity measures 
in all pig production clusters was demonstrated to be an appropriate strategy for sustainable control of CSF and 
the establishment of a stable epidemiological situation.
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From an economic standpoint, classical swine 
fever (CSF) is the major threat to pig production 
in any country. The financial consequences depend 
strongly on the number of outbreaks, the duration 
of the epizootic and on the type and effectiveness 
of applied control measures. By means of simula-
tion models, possible patterns, different pig pro-
duction operations, risk factors, economic impact 
and control strategies can be simulated using dif-
ferent simulation models. In most cases these are 
mass-action, state-transition Monte Carlo simula-
tion models. For example, Jalvingh et al. (1999) and 
Martinez-Lopez et al. (2011) used a similar model 
to simulate a CSF epizootic and thereby to evaluate 
control measures. Durand and Mahul (2000) used 
state-transition models to analyse the impact of 
herd density and control measures on virus spread. 
Models are usually very flexible and the user can 
easily control different input parameters such as: 
production types, spatial data, disease spread pa-
rameters, control parameters etc. (Karsten et al. 
2005a; Karsten et al. 2005b).
In this paper, a stochastic simulation model is 
described that was developed to simulate a CSF 
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epidemic in two municipalities in the Republic 
of Serbia. The objective was the analysis of pos-
sible control strategies for CSF eradication, based 
on raising the level of implemented biosecurity 
measures, gradual transition of low-biosecurity-
level holdings to high-biosecurity-level categories 
of farms and the increasing of the effectiveness of 
this approach in the case of a CSF outbreak.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Geographical area and tested population. The 
study was conducted in the territory of the Serbian 
municipalities of Sremska Mitrovica and Sid. This 
is an area with a relatively high density of pigs but 
also with significant diversity in pig-breeding tech-
nology, including backyard production. The study 
included high-biosecurity-level pig farms (com-
mercial farms, family farms type A) and low-level-
biosecurity pig farms and holdings (family farms 
type B and rural backyard holdings). According to 
stratification based on biosecurity, a commercial 
farm means any farm that has almost two of the 
following characteristics: animals slaughtered in 
approved abattoirs, the presence of a farm veteri-
narian, national or international market-oriented 
with high biosecurity measures such as no swill 
feeding, no contact between the pigs and other sus-
ceptible animals, the owner/keeper changes clothes 
on entering the stable and leaving the stable, no 
visitors are allowed to enter, etc. 
Based on biosecurity criteria, pig farms are di-
vided into four categories:
– Commercial farm: is a holding where pigs are 
kept according to all regulated conditions for pig 
breeding; it is enlisted in the Farm Register; all 
health protection measures are implemented, 
with the highest level of biosecurity and hygiene
– Family farm type A: is a holding where there is 
a number of animals (in any case more than 11), 
which delivers live pigs to the market and where 
all animal health protection measures with the 
highest level of biosecurity and hygiene are im-
plemented
– Family farm type B: is a holding where there is a 
number of animals ≥ 11; delivers live pigs to the 
market; required hygienic and health protection 
measures are not fully implemented, or not im-
plemented at all, with a consequent insufficient 
level of biosecurity
– Backyard holding: is a holding where there is a 
small number of animals ≤ 10 kept for owner’s 
purposes (consumption); the levels of animal 
health protection, biosecurity and hygiene are 
low and inefficient
Source of data. The data on the number of pigs, 
production categories, and geographical locations 
were collected during the field investigation. In 
cases where data were not accessible, these were 
obtained from the Central Database of Ministry of 
the Agriculture and the geographical coordinates 
were determined in ARC GIS 10.0, by random se-
lection (Gatrell 2004).
Structure and description of the simulation 
model. The simulation was performed using the 
computer-based North American Animal Disease 
Spread Model (NAADSM) version 4.0.11, a temporal 
and spatial stochastic model based on the Monte 
Carlo method (Harvey et al. 2007).The basic idea 
underlying the Monte Carlo method is the approxi-
mation of the expected value E(X) by the arithmetic 
mean of results of a large number of independent 
tests (simulations) all with the same distribution 
as X. The stochastic process in the simulation uses 
random variables and is based on the law of ran-
dom numbers, for which purpose random numbers 
with specific distribution need to be generated. This 
is achieved using computer programs specifically 
developed for this purpose. The essence of each of 
these programs is a random number generator, or a 
semi-random number generator, while the quality 
of simulation directly depends on the quality of the 
random number generator. In this regard, the Monte 
Carlo is the method of choice by which the system 
can be simplified in order to analyse the dynamics 
of disease and possible outcomes of the epidemic. 
The data describing the disease and the mode of 
transmission can be changed and adapted to the real 
environment. The model parameters are data that 
are taken from the literature, obtained during field 
studies, retrospective analysis of previous epidemics 
or taken from expert opinion. Mode of transmission 
of the virus and disease dynamics are mathematically 
described and transferred into the model. To ensure 
the reliability of the model and at the same time 
avoid excessive complexity, the model is a simplified 
imitation of important natural phenomena and fac-
tors that contribute to the emergence and spread of 
diseases (Stanojevic 2014). 
NAADSM is a computer program based on the 
Monte Carlo method and is developed for the simu-
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lation of contagious animal diseases such as foot-
and-mouth disease, avian influenza, New Castle 
disease, classical swine fever and other highly con-
tagious diseases. The software was developed by a 
team of experts of the Centre for Epidemiology and 
Animal Health at the US Department of Agriculture 
in Fort Collins, Colorado (Veterinary Services 
Science, Technology, and Analysis Services-Centre 
for Animal Health and Epidemiology-VS-Ceah 
STAS) (Harvey et al. 2007). 
The spread of disease and the mode of transmis-
sion of a virus in nature have elements of a stochas-
tic event, but there are also certain patterns. Since 
the progression of an epidemic largely depends on 
environmental factors, the host and the pathogen, 
risk factors that are associated with this epide-
miological triangle influence each epidemic and 
make them different (Harvey et al. 2007; Harvey 
and Reeves 2010). 
NAADSM is a herd-based, geo-spatial state 
transitional model. One state is assigned to each 
simulated herd: susceptible, latent, subclinical 
infectious, clinical infectious, naturally immune, 
vaccine immune or dead. The stochastic spread 
mechanisms act spatially by use of the geographi-
cal location of farms. The farm is considered as an 
epidemiological unit and model dose not simulate 
spread of CSF within farms.
The model simulates the transmission of disease 
between farms with different statuses: susceptible 
to infection, latently infected, subclinical infection, 
clinical infection, euthanised animals, and farms 
with immune (vaccinated) pigs (Figure 1).
Table 1 describes the definition of the disease 
transition states. The model of each scenario start-
ed with one latent herd and the rest were suscepti-
ble. A latently infected herd was selected randomly 
from the list of holdings and farms in the region 
under the study.
Each simulation was performed in 1000 repli-
cations. The model simulates the daily spread of 
classical swine fever virus between farms and back-
yard farms. The units (farms and backyard farms) 
interact with each other. The model simulates the 
direct and indirect contacts, whether they are apart 
or are in close proximity. These contacts are related 
to transport of animals from one farm to another 
and indirect contacts through vehicles and people. 
The model also simulates the local spread of the 
disease (Harvey et al. 2007; Stanojevic 2014).
Simulation was performed under assumptions 
that all susceptible pigs were equally susceptible. 
All infected pigs spread the virus throughout the 
herd, and all infected pigs eventually showed clin-
ical signs. However, there are differences in the 
Figure 1. States and transitions simulated by NAADSM. Without intervention, units will follow the state progression 
indicated in the outer loop. Upon the implementation of disease control measures, intervening actions may alter the 
normal disease cycle, as shown inside the loop (Reeves et al. 2012; with author’s permission)
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probability of developing the disease after the oc-
currence of adequate contact. These differences in 
the probability are conditioned by the type of the 
farm, production of the pigs (open or closed type of 
production) and the level of biosecurity measures 
introduced. In some scenarios a number of pigs are 
vaccinated and have artificially induced immunity, 
which makes them resistant to the disease. Given 
that the model is based on the Monte Carlo method, 
the events “contact between the various units – ad-
equate contact” and “contact between the various 
units that caused the transmission of diseases – ef-
fective contact” are stochastically generated using a 
random number generator. Adequate contact does 
not necessarily mean an infection with the virus 
and outbreak of disease. Only effective contact 
initiates the disease transmission and outbreak of 
CSF on a farm. These rules apply to both types of 
contacts, direct and indirect. At the beginning of 
the simulation all farms in the region have the same 
status, “susceptible”, except in those cases where it 
simulates a case where on a number of farms and 
rural farms preventive vaccination of pigs has been 
conducted. 
The stochastic and spatial simulation of the 
spread of CSF starts with an initialisation phase, in 
which farm-specific data like geographic location, 
numbers of animals, farm type and infected herd or 
herds (index cases) are introduced into the model. 
On each day of a simulated outbreak, every in-
fectious unit will have direct contact with some 
number of other units in the population. Only 
movements from infectious (infectious subclini-
cal, or infectious clinical) units that have not been 
quarantined are recorded. Once the total number 
of contacts that will occur is established, the model 
then determines which units will receive those con-
tacts as well the effects of each contact. After the 
source units for each direct contact are established, 
recipient units for each contact are determined, 
based on the distance of potential recipients from a 
source. If a susceptible recipient unit is selected for 
a contact, a stochastic process determines whether 
that source unit will become infected (Harvey et 
al. 2007).
When an epidemiological unit acquires the status 
of “latent infection”, during the simulation it then 
passes through the other statuses predefined in the 
model. At the same time, by defining the param-
eters that describe the disease, control measures are 
also modelled. These measures may differ in differ-
ent scenarios, depending on the chosen strategy of 
control. Basically, the “infected” farms, after acquir-
ing the status of “discovered” in the framework of 
a pre-determined time frame, undergo measures 
related to the depopulation of animals. In this way 
the infectious period of the farms ends and they no 
longer can serve as a source of infection for other 
farms. The control strategy in some scenarios also 
includes the possibility of preventive depopulation 
of animals, control of movement, the establishment 
of protection and surveillance zones around the 
infected farms, active surveillance in the protection 
and surveillance zones, sampling for the purpose 
of laboratory tests, etc.
Control measures are defined simultaneously. 
Measures can differ in the different model scenar-
ios, depending on the selected control strategies. To 
avoid computational complexity, the infectious and 
clinical sign states were simulated at the farm level 
and any other causes of mortality were assumed to 
be negligible. The model puts a special accent on 
measures that help in reducing the probability of 
occurrence of CSF. Farms and holdings are clas-
Table 1. Definition of statuses through which animals pass in the model
Status Definition of status
Susceptible all animals in the herd not infected but can be infected in the case of contact with a diseased animal
Latent period between exposure and infection. Some animals in the herd are infected, but still do not shed the virus
Subclinical infection some animals in the herd are infected and shed the virus. No clinical symptoms 
Clinical infection some animals in the herd are infected, shed the virus, and show a clinical image of the disease 
Vaccinated animals in the herd are vaccinated and are not susceptible to CSF 
Dead from disease animals died due CSF 
Culled all animals in the herd are culled during implementation of CSF eradication measures 
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sified into categories and are organised into four 
strata. Each stratum is higher and better than the 
previous one with respect to the level of biosecu-
rity. All infected pigs, after a short latent period, 
spread the virus throughout a susceptible popu-
lation. Differences in probability of an outbreak 
after exposure to adequate contact are conditioned 
by the level of implemented biosecurity measures 
and type of pig production. Biosecurity measures 
involve measures such as artificial insemination, 
good practice on the farms, improved breeding 
technology, cleaning and disinfection, wearing 
protective clothes etc. In the first scenario, which 
emulates the present environment, some pigs are 
vaccinated which makes them non-susceptible. 
In other scenarios a non-vaccination policy is as-
sumed. Emergency vaccination is used as an alter-
native to preventive slaughter. The model designed 
in this way shows the worst case scenario.
The results obtained after 1000 replications are 
expressed in terms of mean values, standard devia-
tions, minimum amount, the maximum amount 
and quintiles, providing the information on the 
number of infected animals and farms, outbreak 
duration, culled animals, and costs related to the 
control of the disease. After simulation, a set of 
epidemiological data were analysed to evaluate the 
most effective strategy.
Disease parameters. The characteristics of the 
disease and the assigned attributes are based on 
data from the literature and the results of retro-
spective analyses of CSF cases in the Republic of 
Serbia in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (Tables 1, 2) (Backera 
et al. 2011).
For incorporation of the disease parameter into 
the model probability density functions were used. 
Probability density functions are distributions of 
values representative of the natural range of pos-
sible values for model parameters, e.g. the time 
period in which an infected herd is latent or clini-
cally infectious (Figure 2 and Figure 3). During the 
simulation, values are drawn randomly from prob-
ability density functions as a simulation runs.
Transmission of disease (efficient contact): The 
following modes of transmission are simulated: 
direct contact between diseased and susceptible 
animals, indirect contact through contaminated 
vehicles, equipment, workers. Contact rate is based 
on average values and the process is simulated using 
a Poisson distribution.
During a field visit, information about the move-
ment of animals was collected. Average movements 
were calculated for movements to and from mar-
kets and then recalculated into an average daily 
number of movements. Further, which herd types 
deliver pigs to other herds also plays a role. For 
example, a commercial farm can receive pigs only 
from other commercial farms whereas family farms 
could interact with different types of farms etc.
Contact rates vary for different types and cat-
egories of holdings, expressed on a daily level. The 
direction of movement of animals, people and vehi-
cles to and from holdings are random, and the dis-
tances of movement were based on two probability 
density functions, one for direct contact and the 
other for indirect contact. The distance distribu-
tions for direct and indirect contact were assumed 
to each be a triangular density function with a mini-
mum, most likely, and maximum distance.
Transmission by wind is not included in the mod-
el, since it is seldom described in the literature and 
is unlikely to be of any epidemiological importance.
Control strategy: Detection of disease. The 
model includes detection of clinical cases only. 
There are two basic parameters simulated by the 
model with respect to diagnostics and detection 
of CSF cases on a holding: (1) probability of de-
tection of first cases of the disease (Figure 4) and 
Figure 2. Latent period (Stanojevic 2014)
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Figure 3. Clinical infectious period (Stanojevic 2014)
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Table 2. Disease transmission parameters and probability distribution function used in the stochastic model
Parameters Probability distribution The mean value/standard deviation in days
The latent period (Laddomada 2000) poisson distribution 7(1); 8(1) 
Subclinical period (Martınez-Lopez et al. 2011) poisson distribution 21 
Infectious period (Backer et al. 2011) gamma distribution alfa: 13.5, beta: 1 
Immune period after vaccination  
(Qiu et al. 2006)
the normal Gaussian  
distribution 300/60 
The number of direct contacts between animals 
daily – direct sales to owners* poisson distribution 
Type of farm Intensity
industrial farms 0.07
type A 0.009
type B 0.0074
back yard farm 0.0036
Number of contacts direct natural mating 
(mating animals)* poisson distribution 
Type of farm Intensity
type B 0.016
rural farm 0.0057
The probability of transmission of the virus 
through direct contact depending on what type 
of farm was the source of infection  
(Karsten et al. 2006) 
bernoulli distribution 
Type of farm Probability
industrial farms 0.7
type A 0.7
type B 0.8
rural farm 0.8
Number of indirect contacts per day* poisson distribution 
Type of farm Intensity
industrial farms 0.1428
type A 0.1428
type B 0.0330
rural farm 0.2850
Local spread of the virus (Karsten et al. 2006) bernoulli distribution 
Distance from the farm Mean value
150 m 0.020
150–250 m 0.010
250–500 m 0.004
500–1000 m 0.002
The probability of detecting the first appearance 
of clinical symptoms of CSF from the moment 
when the farm became infectious  
(Engel et al. 2005)
fixed value
Number of days Probability (%)
8 0
10 3
20 7
25 10
37 50
47 90
20 100
The probability of detecting cases of death 
due to infection by the CSFV from the time of 
occurrence of the first cases of death (placing 
suspected on the basis of the pathoanatomic 
findings) (Klinkenberg et al. 2005)
fixed value
Number of days Probability (%)
1 20
2 30
3 40
4 50
5 60
6 70
7 80
8 100
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(2) probability of reporting the detected cases based 
on information that the disease is present on holding 
(Reeves et al. 2012).The probability of detection of 
first cases or observing clinical signs represents the 
probability that the farmer or the veterinarian would 
report suspicious signs of CSF to the competent au-
thority given that infection had been present in the 
herd for a certain number of days (Reeves et al. 2012). 
If an infected unit successfully detected and reported 
to the competent authority, it was automatically quar-
antined and destroyed if positive laboratory results 
were revealed. In contrast, if a farm is not detected, 
it will continue to spread the disease.
Control strategy: Control measures. Elements 
of the control strategy are based on applicable 
measures prescribed in Serbian national legal acts 
and include the setting up of protected and surveil-
lance zones, complete cessation of pig movements, 
restricted movement of vehicles, equipment, and 
people, implementation of control measures in pro-
tection and surveillance zones, tracing back of all 
movements, epidemiological investigation of the 
disease, euthanasia of susceptible animals on in-
fected and contact holdings, vaccination of animals 
in defined zones, indemnification of costs, etc.
The current strategy of control and eradication of 
CSF in the Republic of Serbia is based on the trans-
position of EU legislation and scientific attitudes 
that member states of the EU apply in cases of the 
occurrence of CSF (Plavsic et al. 2012).
Council Directive 2001/89/EC (Anonymous 
2001) provides for measures to control CSF, which 
must be applied in the event of a disease outbreak 
in the EU. These measures are minimum measures. 
However, some EU countries, specifically in areas 
with a high density of pigs, include the destruction 
of all pigs within a radius of 500 m around the site 
of an outbreak as an additional measure. In fact, EU 
member states often opt for culling all pigs in areas 
with a radius significantly wider than 500 metres. 
In Serbia, there are plans to stop the implementa-
tion of preventive vaccination against CSF in the 
near future. However, there are no concrete data 
to show any positive effects that can be expected 
in the case of application of these measures, and 
it also remains unclear what the risk of disease 
and uncontrolled spread of the virus throughout 
susceptible populations in the case of cessation of 
vaccination would be. In this sense, for the purpose 
Parameters Probability distribution The mean value/standard deviation in days
The probability of successful tracking  
of shipments of animals that have left  
an infected farm**
bernoulli distribution
Type of farm Mean value
commercial Farm 0.80
family farm type A 0.80
family farm type B 0.80
rural farm 0.40
The probability of successful detection and 
monitoring of indirect contact with an infected 
farm (Martinez-Lopez et al. 2005) 
bernoulli distribution 
Type of farm Mean value
commercial Farm 0.95
family farm type A 0.90
rural farm 0.20
Sensitivity and specificity of diagnostic tests fixed value 
sensitivity 99%
specificity 99%
*data collected in the field; **data based on a 2010 CSF epidemic in Serbia
Table 2 to be continued
Figure 4. The probability of detection of first cases or 
observing clinical signs of CSF on industrial farms, type 
A, B and backyard farms. The detection probability was 
modelled as based on the results of Klinkenberg et al. 
(2005) and Engel et al. (2005) and available data from 
epidemics of CSF in Serbia between 2005–2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Pe
rc
en
t p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Days
Relational function
560
Original Paper Veterinarni Medicina, 60, 2015 (10): 553–566
doi: 10.17221/8494-VETMED
of simulation, this strategy has been modified and 
incorporated into the model. The modified control 
strategy which has been challenged through the 
simulations consists of depopulation of infected 
herds, surveillance and movement restriction in 
zones with radiuses of 3 km and 10 km and active 
surveillance in contact herds. It differs from the 
original with respect to the depopulation strategy 
and use of alternative measures such as emergency 
vaccination. The destruction radius around a com-
mercial farm in the case of an outbreak is set to 
100 m instead of 500 m and for family farms de-
population is only limited to the affected farm and 
farms in the immediate neighbourhood. Emergency 
vaccination is an alternative to preventive slaughter.
Control strategy: Tracing. In the model, a trace-
forward investigation is conducted for all types of 
farms and backyard holdings. The tracing occurs 
immediately and traces the direct and indirect 
contacts. If a recipient of contact was successfully 
traced, it is automatically quarantined and de-
stroyed if positive laboratory results are achieved 
for CSF. The trace direct contacts were simulated 
at 21 days before detection with 100% probabil-
ity of trace success for commercial farms and 80% 
for the other production types. Indirect contacts 
were simulated 21 days (Anonymous 2002) before 
detection with an 80% probability of trace success 
on commercial farms, family farms types A and B, 
and 40% for backyard holdings.
Control strategy: Depopulation of diseased 
animals. The timeframe and capacities of the vet-
erinary service for euthanasia and safe destruction 
of animals are pre-set according to specific circum-
stances in the regions. Depopulation is limited only 
on infected holdings and immediate neighbourhood 
holdings, as well as on infected commercial farms 
and farms in the surrounding area (100 m radius).
Control strategy: Vaccination. Depending on 
the scenario, several different hypothetical situ-
ations were simulated, including the application 
of preventive mass-vaccination measures, the no-
vaccination CSF control policy and emergency vac-
cination. Vaccination campaigns were simulated for 
all production types. For emergency vaccination 
one diseased unit of any production type must be 
detected before the vaccination program begins. 
The delay in unit immunity followed vaccination 
was four days (Kaden and Lange 2001; Qiu et al. 
2006). The vaccination priorities were based on 
reason for vaccination, production type and days 
holding. The timeframe, radius of vaccination zone 
and capacities of the veterinary service for vac-
cination are known in advance and pre-set. In all 
scenarios emergency vaccination is an alternative 
to preventive slaughter. The radius of the ring of 
vaccination in the case of emergency vaccination 
was set to 10 km around the affected farm.
Setting up the scenario. Different scenarios were 
formulated and defined during the simulation pro-
cess (Table 3). One thousand iterations of each sce-
nario were run. This study compared the current 
CSF control strategy in the Republic of Serbia with 
different hypothetical scenarios. Output statistics 
of simulations varied in the number of farms, hold-
ings and infected animals, animals depopulated, 
number of herds and animals vaccinated, duration 
of outbreaks based on the mitigation strategy ap-
Table 3. Definition of the different scenarios
 
Scenario
1 2 3 4
Number of commercial farms 3 3 9 9
Number of family farms type A 35 35 145 175
Number of family farms type B 116 116 26 623
Number of backyard farms 1 053 1 053 1 027 400
Total number of holdings and farms of all types included in the simulation 1 207 1 207 1 207 1 207
Total number of animals in the simulation 36 370 36 370 36 370 36 370
Number of holdings with non-vaccinated animals 751 1 206 1 206 1 206
Number of non-vaccinated animals 10 224 36 361 36 361 36 361
Number of holdings with immune animals 455 0 0 0
Number of vaccinated animals at the beginning of the CSF epidemic. 2 6137 0 0 0
Percentage of vaccinated animals at the beginning of the CSF epidemic 72.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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plied, etc. When destruction and vaccination were 
complete, the outbreak was considered over with 
no more latent or infected farms and holdings.
The basic assumption was that upgrading the bi-
osecurity level on a number of holdings and farms 
would result in different hypothetical situations 
with respect to the present condition and possible 
outcomes. The control strategy was modified and 
adjusted to fit the specificity of rural areas with ex-
tensive and heterogeneous pig production in terms 
of depopulation policy and application of emergency 
vaccination. At the same time a hypothesis was made 
that, depending on the level of established biosecu-
rity measures, in conditions where all other control 
strategy factors are the same, there is a meaningful 
difference between possible outcomes. Four hypo-
thetical scenarios were formulated in this way:
– Scenario 1: current condition. Control strategy 
starts from the assumption that preventive vacci-
nation against CSF is performed constantly, with 
different performance level
– Scenario 2: current condition, but without imple-
mentation of preventive vaccination. Emergency 
vaccination and limited depopulation of diseased 
animals were applied
– Scenario 3: a number of family farms type A and 
type B are upgraded to commercial farms and 
family farms type A. Non-vaccination policy was 
implemented. Emergency vaccination and limited 
depopulation of diseased animals were applied
– Scenario 4: a number of family farms type A, 
type B and rural holdings are upgraded to com-
Table 4. Summary of the simulation results after 1000 iterations
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
p95 µ δ p95 µ δ p95 µ δ p95 µ δ
Total number of holdings with  
clinically diseased animals during the 
simulation
24 9 8 57 25 17 36 17 10 75 31 23
Total number of clinically diseased  
animals during the simulation 481 176 155 1 906 807 584 1 122 549 335 1 003 406 324
Total number of holdings where  
euthanasia was carried out 37 14 12 148 52 45 113 45 34 176 63 56
Total number of culled animals 1 000 341 334 5 181 1 707 1 580 3 452 1 456 1037 3 123 1 074 992
Total number of holdings where pig  
vaccination was performed 1 202 1 113 194 1 202 1 178 66 1 202 1 178 82 1 202 1 178 64
Vaccinated animals 36 323 33 406 5 939 36 329 35 552 2 135 36 327 35 562 2 596 36 331 35 725 2 020
Total examined blood samples 1 548 542 513 3 446 1 429 1 065 5 095 1 742 1 618 2 492 824 784
Total holdings in the simulation 1 208 1 208 1 208 1 208
Total pigs in the simulation 36 370 36 370 36 370 36 370
mercial farms, family farms type A and family 
farms type B. Non-vaccination policy was im-
plemented. Emergency vaccination and limited 
depopulation of diseased animals were applied
Sensitivity analysis. In order to validate the 
model, sensitivity analysis was performed. For the 
purpose of sensitivity analysis the worst case sce-
nario was selected (scenario number 2). Parameters 
like direct contact rate, probability of transmission 
of the virus via indirect contact, movement con-
trol and probability of success for the direct trac-
ing of direct contacts for sensitivity analysis were 
changed from the baseline value. Values of selected 
parameters were changed from baseline values in 
a sensitivity analysis to assess their independent 
influence on the disease modelling results. For 
each variable independent simulation was run. The 
baseline probability of transmission given indirect 
contact was changed ± 25%. Sensitivity analysis of 
the contact rates was also completed with the direct 
contact rates adjusted to ± 25% of the baseline rate 
parameter. The influence of movement controls 
was assessed by changing the baseline movement 
control by –20% and –40%.
RESULTS
By analysing the results, it was determined that 
preventive vaccination would result in less direct 
damage, a lower number of diseased and culled 
animals, and a shorter duration of the epidemic in 
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the case of a CSF outbreak. When setting up all four 
scenarios, meaningful differences were observed in 
the applied strategies. The measure of depopula-
tion of animals proved to be an effective measure 
in all cases, as well as the measure of ring vaccina-
tion. On the other hand, it was observed that the 
lowest economic losses are present when preven-
tive vaccination is practiced and stable immunity 
of animals is maintained.
The greatest losses occur in the simulations of 
the second scenario, where preventive vaccination 
is forbidden. In the third and fourth scenario, also 
with no vaccination but with an improvement in the 
biosecurity level on pig farms/holdings, the results 
have indicated that there is a significantly lower 
number of diseased animals and less economic 
loses (Tables 4 and 5).
The results obtained during the simulation are 
shown in Tables 4 and 5. The data were presented 
in the form of descriptive statistics: mean, standard 
deviation and the 95th percentile. The epizootiolog-
ical and economic values of four different strategies 
(scenarios) were obtained during the simulation 
and compared in Tables 4 and 5. Epidemiological 
and economic data clearly indicate the existence 
of statistically significant differences between the 
different scenarios and application of different CSF 
control measures. The tables show that the appli-
cation of the measures included in scenario num-
ber 1 give the best results in terms of the number 
of diseased animals and costs. Scenario number 1 
comprises the CSF control measures based on pre-
ventive vaccination, which is appropriate for the 
present situation. By analysing the results obtained 
during the simulation of CSF and implementation 
of measures included in the scenarios 2, 3 and 4, 
the relationship between the level of biosecurity 
measures introduced on the farms and the number 
of infected pigs and scope of economic damages 
could be determined. In scenario number 2 here, 
which emulates the present situation in term of 
pig production and hypothetical situation of CSF 
control without vaccination, the economic dam-
age and the number of infected animals are the 
greatest. In scenarios 3 and 4, where the level of 
biosecurity measures were raised, the number of 
infected pigs, culled pigs and economic damages 
decrease gradually.
The results underline the importance of biosecu-
rity, especially in commercial and family farms type 
A and indicate that a non-vaccination policy should 
be associated with implementation of biosecurity 
measures. All scenarios have demonstrated that 
an increase in the level of biosecurity measures 
reduces the spread of disease and economic dam-
age. Due to more intensive movement of animals on 
commercial farms the risk for rapid spread is higher 
if CSF emerges on a commercial farm or family 
Table 5. Summary of economic indices of the simulation after 1000 iterations (95th percentile)
 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4
Number of holdings with initially diseased animals at the beginning 
of the epidemic 1 1
1 1
Initially diseased animals at the beginning of the epidemic 9 9 9 9
Total number of holdings where euthanasia was carried out (p95) 37 148 113 176
Total number of culled animals (p95) 1000 5181 3452 3123
Total number of holdings where the animals were vaccinated (p95) 1202 1202 1202 1202
Total number of vaccinated animals (p95) 36 323 36 329 36 327 36 331
Total examined blood samples 1548 5095 3446 2492
Costs of cleaning and disinfection (EUR) 12 100 48 400 36 970 56 560
Costs of euthanasia (EUR) 1610 8350 5560 5030
Compensation for damage (EUR) 73 620 381 420 254 140 229 960 
Safe destruction-rendering plant (EUR) 7850 40 690 27 110 24 530
Costs of vaccination (EUR) 43 690 43 690 43 690 43 690
Costs of surveillance (EUR) 4560 15 010 10 150 7340
Total costs (EUR) 143 430 537 560 377 620 367 110
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farm type A. An epidemic starting on a commer-
cial farm will last longer and have larger economic 
consequences. On the other hand, if the epidemic 
emerges in rural areas on family farm type B or on 
a backyard holding, the outbreak of disease could 
be unnoticed for a longer period of time and un-
detected infected farms or backyard holdings will 
continue to spread the virus.
Sensitivity analysis results
When the direct contact rate was changed by 
± 25% from the baseline value, this had little in-
fluence on outbreak duration, but it did influence 
the number of destroyed animals and depopulated 
herds. When contact rate was decreased by 25%, 
the number of destroyed animals (p95) decreased 
by 67% and the number of depopulated herds (p95) 
decreased by 37%. Opposite effects was noted when 
the contact rate was increased. When the prob-
ability of transmission, following indirect contact, 
was changed by ± 25%, it had little influence on the 
duration of the outbreak. Changes of probability of 
transmission following indirect contact was more 
influential on the number of herds depopulated 
and animals destroyed than on the outbreak dura-
tion (e.g. the number of destroyed animals (p95) 
increased by 31% and the number of depopulated 
herds (p95) increased by 47%). The opposite effect 
was noted when the probability decreased.
Altering the effectiveness of movement controls 
was very influential. When indirect movement 
controls were decreased by 20%, the numbers of 
herds depopulated decreased by 65% (p95). When 
indirect movement controls decreased by 40% the 
number of herds depopulated increased by 180%.
DISCUSSION
This study presented possible outcomes of CSF 
outbreaks in a limited area with high-to-moderate 
pig density and under conditions of very heteroge-
neous pig production. It does not reflect the situa-
tion in the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia, 
but it does indicate possible approaches to long-
term eradication of CSF in this country. The model 
applied in this simulation has certain limitations, 
considering that it implies random movement of 
animals, which is not always the case, especially 
when closed systems of pig keeping are concerned. 
One of the potential sources of error is the system 
assumption that vaccinated pigs are 100% protected 
against a CSF, which is not the case under nor-
mal conditions. Although the models cannot fully 
emulate a biological system, they are capable of 
emulating such systems within the range of sta-
tistically acceptable errors, thus providing useful 
results (Moutou and Durand 2002). The simulation 
did demonstrate that crucial traditional measures 
control the disease well. It was observed that the 
lowest economic losses are incurred when preven-
tive vaccination is practiced and stable immunity of 
animals is maintained. However, this measure can-
not be implemented indefinitely, and it also brings 
some economic consequences in cases of intensive 
production and the potential export of pork.
Good governance of veterinary services, appro-
priate collaboration within the veterinary profes-
sion, active participation of pig owners and traders 
in the control of CSF, early detection of disease 
symptoms and improvement of implementation of 
biosecurity measures in pig farms are prerequisites 
for successful eradication of CSF. Transfer of re-
sponsibility for disease prevention to the owners 
is a must, particularly in terms of a long-term CSF 
eradication strategy, accompanied with national 
animal disease compensation fund development. 
Increasing agricultural subsidies will contribute 
to enhanced motivation of the owners to take an 
active part in solving the issues of CSF control. 
In underdeveloped countries the depopulation of 
animals on infected holdings is also very effective, 
but in a situation with a relatively low density of 
animals there is no need for extensive preventive 
culling of animals. Under the present conditions in 
the Republic of Serbia, based on the results, it is 
not reasonable to implement a CSF control strategy 
based on cessation of vaccination, particularly on 
rural holdings and family farms with lower levels 
of implemented biosecurity measures. Cessation 
of vaccination should be preceded by the analysis 
of economic consequences and the capability of 
the industry to export pork and pig products on 
the markets where a condition for sale is the ces-
sation of vaccination (e.g. EU). Upon the analysis 
of the economic feasibility and sustainability of 
such a program, the next step should be adoption 
of a strategy of cessation of vaccination in stages 
(phases), where actions would be simultaneously 
taken to establish good agricultural and veterinary 
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practices, to introduce high-level biosecurity meas-
ures on holdings and farms where pigs are kept, 
and to cease vaccination in those zones. Money 
that could be saved due to cessation of vaccination 
would have to be redirected to the compensation 
fund, crisis response, early diagnostics, surveillance 
of natural reservoirs, awareness campaigns, and for 
increasing the level of biosecurity measures.
Also, it is important to stress that simple trans-
position of CSF control strategies which are de-
veloped for intensive pig production is not always 
appropriate for underdeveloped countries with low 
levels of pig production.
The EU strategy of control and eradication of 
CSF and regulations do not treat the specifics of 
extensive production and demographic character-
istics of countries with extensive pig production. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the current 
policy of the EU is not universal and cannot be suc-
cessfully applied in all circumstances, the strategy 
should be adjusted for specific pig production and 
the economic situation of the country.
Based on the results, we conclude that a strat-
egy consisting of the minimum control measures 
stipulated by the EU legislation supplemented with 
limited depopulation of contact herds and preven-
tive vaccination is the most effective among the 
evaluated strategies with respect to limiting the 
size, duration and cost of the epidemic.
In the case of the cessation of vaccination, regard-
ing the number of culled animals, the vaccination-to-
live strategies appear to be more effective. Epidemics 
become larger and last longer if the index case is a 
commercial farm. This implies that biosecurity is 
extremely important in preventing the transmission 
of CSF, especially on commercial farms. Stamping-
out modified with emergency vaccination-to-live or 
stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination-
to-slaughter strategies appear to be more effective 
and appropriate for developing countries. The selec-
tion of the strategies depends on the desired CSF-
status after an outbreak and capabilities of export of 
pig meat and live animals. In areas with a moderate-
to-low density of pigs, there is no need for extensive 
preventive culling of animals, especially in villages 
with predominantly backyard or low intensive pro-
duction of pigs. Depopulation can be limited only 
on infected holdings and immediate neighbourhood 
holdings with strict movement control, tracing of 
indirect and direct contacts and wide surveillance 
in the zones.
The simulation has shown the possible dynamics 
of an epidemic and the extent of the possible scale 
of costs, when different approaches to control the 
disease are applied. The simulation revealed that 
the measure of depopulation should be circum-
scribed to the epidemiological situation and density 
of pigs. The model showed that backyard farms are 
very sensitive to the occurrence of CSF; however, 
the potential for spreading the virus from backyard 
farm over a larger distance is limited. The spread 
of disease over long distances is more frequently 
associated with type A, type B and commercial 
farms. The model also showed that the most com-
mon route of transmission of the CSF virus from 
a backyard farm is local spreading while on cat-
egory B farms local spread and indirect contacts 
are the predominant routes of transmission.
The simulations have shown that uncontrolled 
natural mating when boars, so-called “walkers”, are 
used for the mating of sows occupies a special place 
in the spread of the disease at the level of settle-
ments. The occurrence of CSF on Type A family 
farms is usually associated with the purchase of 
animals for fattening from manufacturers from the 
category of type B and backyard farms. Outbreaks 
on commercial farms are commonly associated 
with the introduction of infected animals into the 
herd and contact with backyard farms through 
workers who work on a farm and have their pigs 
at home. Measures of safe disposal of animals and 
also protective vaccination proved to be effective in 
all cases. The least economic damage occurs in con-
ditions where preventive vaccination is practiced, 
and maintains immunity in animals. However, this 
measure cannot be applied indefinitely. It also car-
ries certain economic consequences and affects ex-
port potential for pigs and pork meat in markets 
where the control of CSF without vaccination is 
required.
Simulations have shown that raising the general 
hygiene and biosecurity measures on farms and 
backyard farms significantly reduced the spread 
of disease, the number of infected animals and 
the amount of economic damages in the event of 
a epidemic. In combination with other measures 
of biological protection, such as good management 
practices on the farm, controlled access of people 
and vehicles, eliminating unnecessary contacts 
with other owners of pigs, artificial insemination, 
avoiding contact with wild pigs, such measures 
contribute to significantly reducing the risk of oc-
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currence of CSF. Investment in rearing pigs and 
raising the level of biosecurity measures on family 
farms type B and backyard farms are crucial for the 
eradication of the disease.
Tight control of natural mating and the avoid-
ance of unnecessary indirect contacts on type B 
farms and backyard farms, contributes to a sig-
nificant reduction of risks arising from CSF. When 
natural mating is only allowed to fertilise sows that 
are raised on the same farm in the simulation, e.g. 
male does not leave the farm, the number of in-
fected pigs was lower by 43–59%, and the economic 
damages were reduced by 34–36%. The epidemic 
had an average duration of 67 days. This total was 
14 days shorter compared to a scenario where natu-
ral breeding was not controlled.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results, we conclude that a strat-
egy consisting of the minimum control measures 
stipulated by the EU legislation supplemented with 
limited depopulation of contact herds and preven-
tive vaccination is the most effective among the 
evaluated strategies with respect to limiting the 
size, duration and cost of CSF epidemics.
In the case of cessation of vaccination, regarding 
the number of culled animals, the vaccination-to-
live strategies appear to be most effective. Epidemics 
become larger and last longer if the index case is a 
commercial farm. This implies that biosecurity is 
extremely important to avoid transmission of CSF, 
especially on commercial farms.
Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccina-
tion-to-live or stamping-out modified with emer-
gency vaccination-to-slaughter strategies appear to 
be most effective and appropriate for developing 
countries. The selection of the strategies depends 
on the desired CSF-status after an outbreak and 
capabilities of export of pig meat and live animals.
In areas with a moderate-to-low density of pigs, 
there is no need for extensive preventive culling of 
animals, especially in villages with predominant-
ly backyard or low intensive production of pigs. 
Depopulation can be limited only to infected hold-
ings and immediate neighbourhood holdings with 
strict movement control, tracing of indirect and 
direct contacts and wide surveillance in the zones.
Under the present conditions in the Republic of 
Serbia, it is not reasonable to implement a SCF 
control strategy without vaccination, particularly 
on rural holdings and family farms with lower levels 
of implementation of biosecurity measures.
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